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I am very pleased to have this opportunity to visit with
you since you are responsible for playing a key role in the

self-regulatory structure of the profession.

It is especially

timely that we stand back and re-examine our entire disciplinary

system since we are clearly in the midst of a fast-moving stream

of events that are washing away many of our long-held policies
and traditions.

In short, we are in a period of transition

and we need to rethink what we are doing and what our objectives

should be with respect to disciplining our profession.

In doing this, we need to understand the forces that are
causing us to change our rules of conduct and our approach to

self-regulation.

We have been caught up in separate waves of

concern about protection of consumers and making corporate

managements more accountable for their actions.

These have

led to intensive inquiries by Congress and federal agencies

such as the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
into the structure and practices within our profession as well

as those of other groups.

As you are aware, these forces have culminated in decisions
of the U. S. Supreme Court that left little room for doubt that
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our traditional prohibitions on advertising and solicitation

could not withstand legal challenge under the antitrust laws.

We have responded by voluntarily modifying our rules even
though I am certain that many of us remain unconvinced that
the consumer will be better served by unfettered competition
within our profession.

In changing our rules, we have attempted to retain some
limited restraints by continuing to prohibit direct uninvited
solicitation.

However, even this modest effort to avoid a

completely commercial approach has been judged unacceptable
by the Justice Department.

Recommendations have been made

within that agency to file a complaint against the Institute

in federal court to set aside our rule on encroachment and the

second sentence of Rule 502 on advertising and solicitation.
Our Board of Directors and Council have approved submitting
to a vote of the membership a proposal to voluntarily accede

to the objections of the Justice Department.

However, in the

course of taking this action, a majority of the Council expressed

opposition to the elimination of the prohibition of direct uninvited
solicitation.

In addition, the Board of Directors acted prin

cipally out of the conviction that a voluntary repeal was the

lesser of a set of undesirable alternatives.

It was convinced
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that we would not prevail in litigation and that we would be
better off by retaining the right to urge our members to

voluntarily refrain from direct uninvited solicitation.

This

right would be lost if we were to be enjoined under a court
decision that our present rule is in violation of the antitrust

laws .

While no one can be absolutely certain of the outcome
of a vote by our members, I believe it is highly unlikely

that 2/3 of those voting will favor modification of the
present rule, especially in view of the attitude of our

governing council.

If I am correct, it seems almost certain

that the Justice Department will provide us with the opportunity

to prove our case in court after the vote has been completed.

We will, of course, do our utmost to argue at the highest
possible level of the Justice Department that our need ,to
maintain our independence as auditors justifies, as a matter

of public policy, retaining a restriction on uninvited solicitation.
I must confess, however, that I am not sanguine about our success
in avoiding the filing of a lawsuit or of prevailing in litigation.

While it may seem futile to spend perhaps as much as $1 million
on a case involving very poor odds, we are prepared to do so if
that is the will of the membership.
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In the meantime, I believe it would be inappropriate to

go ahead with discipline under pending cases until such time

as the outcome of the vote is known.

Complaints should be

received and held on file until that time.

In my view,

however, such a policy should not be generally announced
to the membership because we may want to continue enforcement

during litigation and it would be difficult to resume enforce
ment having once announced a hiatus period.

In connection with the proposal to remove the second
sentence of Rule 502, I would like to express a personal
view that those who view the present limitations on

solicitation as the last bastion of professionalism are
vastly overstating the case.

If this is all we have as a

basis for our professionalism, we have no right to lay claim

to being a profession.

Competence, quality of service,

objectivity, integrity, and a learned body of knowledge
are all of far greater importance.
It seems very likely that within the next year or two

most of our behavioral type rules of conduct will either have
been eliminated or rendered unenforceable under court order.

Remaining will be the rules dealing with independence, the
payment or receipt of commissions, confidentiality of client
information, and the enforceability of technical standards.

Even the rule on confidentiality is likely to be further
eroded by attempts of plaintiffs to invoke discovery pro
ceedings .
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disciplinary machinery and make it imperative that we give

careful thought to what our future course ought to be.

The

balance of my remarks are devoted toward this end.

I believe it is clear from recent developments in Washington
that the credibility of self-regulation of our profession rests
squarely on our ability to effectively discipline both individual

CPAs and CPA firms for being found guilty of substandard work.

If this is so, it follows that we should be placing our full

emphasis on surveillance of practice to identify substandard

work as well as violations of our rules on independence.

In

a sense our independence requirements are a part of our technical

standards in that they are likely to come into play in connection
with substandard work.

In these circumstances, violations of

our independence rules might be viewed as constituting deliberate

participation in the issuance of misleading financial statements.

This, of course, can lead to criminal charges which are far more
serious than civil damage suits stemming simply from violations
of technical standards.

If we are to now turn our full disciplinary energies toward

substandard work, we must address a number of difficult questions

that do not lend themselves to simple answers.
are as follows:

These questions
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1.

What constitutes substandard work?

2.

How do we fit sanctions to the degree of
severity of substandard work?

3.

What institutions should make determinations
of guilt or impose sanctions?

I will discuss these in the order mentioned.

WHAT CONSTITUTES SUBSTANDARD WORK

At first blush it might appear to be a simple matter to
determine what types of substandard work should give rise to

discipline.

Most people feel that they know substandard work

when they see it.

But when it comes to evaluating the per

formance of practicing CPAs there are many degrees of

substandard work that make disciplinary decisions very

difficult.

Indeed, in deciding circumstances when auditors

should be held liable, even the courts have had great difficulty

in defining where the dividing lines should be drawn.
Probably everyone would agree that a conscious violation
of the profession’s technical standards or a knowing participa

tion in the issuance of misleading audited financial statements
call for a disciplinary action.

Less clear is whether an honest

oversight or mistake by an auditor should result in a sanction.
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Even if it should not, is there a point of such gross negligence
or recklessness that a sanction should be imposed and where
should the line be drawn?

Also, to what extent should it be

required that harm resulted before the disciplinary process

comes into play?

In most cases involving questionable technical performance

a further complication is the difficulty in determining the
technical standard to which the practitioner should be held.

For example, when a mana
gement fraud has not been detected by
an auditor, it is seldom clear whether a normally prudent

auditor exercising due care would have uncovered the fraud.
Often the technical standards are not sufficiently defined
to be able to measure performance.

For instance, the respon

sibilities of auditors associated with unaudited financial

statements have yet to be fully determined.

Also, the

Continental Vending case is an example of a specific case
where the existence of an appropriate standard to apply was

unclear.
Tribunals faced with making decisions about the adequacy

of technical performance, whether it be the courts, the SEC,

state boards of accountancy, or the profession’s trial boards,
find themselves more often than not making subjective judgments
about what the defendent auditors should have done under the

circumstances.

Such judgments are always made with the benefit
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of hindsight when it is known that a mistake was made and what

caused it.

It would take a body of saints to prevent such

knowledge from causing a bias in the judgment about what the

auditors should have done at the time when the present information
was not known.

Under these circumstances it seems clear that the standards

for determining misconduct are, to a large extent, established

ad hoc by subjective judgments made with the benefit of hind
sight.

Broad concepts such as negligence, recklessness and

scienter ma
y be followed but applying them to a specific set
of facts is largely a subjective process.

Thus, the profession

is in a position of having to impose discipline on the basis of

a shifting set of standards subjectively determined by hindsight.
This is not to say that the standards of the profession are
useless or should be ignored for disciplinary purposes.

But

compliance with them is no guarantee that in a particular
set of circumstances an auditor will or should be held blameless.
There is simply no substitute for the application of good

judgment when*it comes to imposing discipline for substandard
work.

As previously noted, it is one thing to describe in a

general way what types of substandard work should give rise
to discipline but it is quite another to make judgments about
whether in a specific case misconduct that should result in
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discipline has occurred.

Nevertheless, the profession, the

courts, and governmental regulatory bodies should and must do

the best they can to impose punishment fairly for offenses under

broad categories, however imprecise they may be.

HOW DO WE FIT SANCTIONS TO THE DEGREE
OF SEVERITY OF SUBSTANDARD WORK
The range of possible sanctions that might be imposed by

the profession’s organizations against members or firms include:
1.

Letters of constructive criticism.

2.

Private or public administrative reprimands.

3.

Private or public censure by trial boards.

4.

Remedial actions, including peer reviews and
attendance at specified educational courses.

5.

Suspension or expulsion from membership in
the profession’s organizations.

Based upon experience to date, it seems clear that a great
deal of judgment must be exercised in applying these sanctions.

However, if uneven justice is to be avoided, we must develop

more specific guidelines on when a particular sanction should
be imposed.

I admit that this is a difficult task but if we

are going to step up our enforcement of technical standards, it
will be imperative to have such guidelines to assure members

that they are being fairly treated.
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I suggest that the professional ethics division turn its

attention to this need as soon as possible in anticipation of
what lies ahead.

WHAT INSTITUTIONS SHOULD MAKE DETERMINATIONS
OF GUILT OR IMPOSE SANCTIONS?

A major question to be addressed is whether the present

forms of discipline of the profession are sufficient to assure
the levels of performance that can reasonably be expected,

given the nature of the functions involved.

The Commission

on Auditors’ Responsibilities concluded:

"The Total system as it now exists, including
litigation and actions by regulatory bodies,

provides a reasonable level of protection to

the public.

Nevertheless improvements in the

system are warranted and should be implemented.”
At the hearings of the House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations chaired by Congressman Moss, contrary views

were expressed.

The SEC and members of Congress believed that

a more stringent system of regulation of CPA firms practicing

before the SEC is necessary either within the AICPA or a quasigovernmental body under the control of the SEC.

It can be argued
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that the threat of unlimited legal liability is sufficient,

standing alone, to assure that the profession will take all

reasonable steps to avoid audit failures.

Some have questioned

whether it makes sense for the profession to add its own layer
of discipline on top of legal liability, SEC sanctions, and
the possible suspension by state boards of accountancy.

Although

this addition may not be necessary from the standpoint of
needed restraining pressures, it is likely that neither the
profession nor the public is prepared to accept a complete

abdication of disciplinary responsibility by the profession.
To the contrary, there are strong pressures to increase the

amount of self-regulation and make it more effective.
Despite these pressures, I believe we ought to stop and

ask ourselves how many layers are really necessary to properly

protect the public against malpractice.

I am troubled by the

suggestion of the SEC and some of our members that the state

boards should now be stimulated into aggressive action.

It

seems to me that this will only aggravate the present duplication
whereby a practitioner can be subjected to multiple disciplinary

proceedings by the courts, the SEC, the state societies, and
the AICPA in addition to the state boards for the same offense.

This strikes me as gross over-kill.
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Perhaps the time has arrived for a complete overhaul of
the disciplinary structure.

One possible solution to the

present and potential duplication and credibility problems

might be the creation of an independent non-profit organization,
similar in concept to the FASB, to receive and investigate all
complaints and to conduct hearings to make a determination of
guilt or innocence.

Such an independent, free-standing body

could provide its findings to the state boards, the state
societies, and the Institute for use in imposing appropriate

sanctions.

This would eliminate the duplication and might

well be more effective in dealing with the highly complex
technical standards cases that we must increasingly come to

grips with.
I have not developed the details of such an approach but
it offers interesting possibilities, including the utilization
of non-members of the profession such as members of the bar or

retired judges.

Financing would, of course, be a problem but

I believe that it could be solved by a combination of contribu

tions and fees required as a condition to membership or holding
of a CPA certificate.
Whether or not this is a good idea, I have suggested that

the time is ripe for NASBA and the Institute to jointly reexamine
the whole approach to disciplining the profession.

Let’s not
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engage in adding more layers and patches to what is obviously
an outdated structure.

It seems to me to be a form of madness

to proceed with attempts to crank up fifty different jurisdictions
with all of the lack of uniformity, duplication, and unevenness

of sanctions that such a course entails.

Until an alternative approach is developed, however, we
ought to move forward with improving our present integrated

disciplinary machinery and bringing all of the state societies

within the program.

Also, we should be considering what

restructuring is required to devote our main emphasis and
attention to the surveillance of practice and dealing promptly

and effectively with cases involving substandard work.
In this connection, I intend to explore with the Board

of Directors the desirability of converting the present practice
review function to being a research and surveillance arm of
the professional ethics division.

I believe the time has come

to adopt a much more aggressive approach to searching out
malpractice.

This will require a staff group whose sole

function will be to utilize every source available to search
out evidence of substandard work that should give rise to

discipline.
The practice review function is presently intended to

be educational and not punitive.

While it has done useful
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work in the past, I believe that we can no longer afford the

luxury of this soft approach.

In any event, our technical

information service division is fully capable of providing
the guidance needed by practitioners and we have extensive

CPE programs to meet the educational needs of our members.

I hope that the AICPA’s Board and Council will agree that
we should now move to a practice review function whose mission

is to identify cases requiring discipline.
A key problem that must be resolved in dealing promptly
and effectively with technical standards cases is finding a
way to take disciplinary action immediately even though litigation
is involved in an alleged case of substandard audit performance.

Because we do not have subpeona powers, we have found

to be an insurmountable barrier to prompt action.

litigation

We cannot

compel production of witnesses or evidence and our files are
open to discovery by adverse parties in litigation.
Most CPA firms take the position that the profession

should not attempt to preempt the judicial system.

On the

other hand, the SEC, members of Congress, and other critics
of the profession’s disciplinary efforts find our policy of

deferring action to be wholly unacceptable.
To solve this problem and avoid a new federal regulatory

body from being established, somebody will have to give ground.
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Either the SEC and members of Congress must be persuaded by
the merits of our policy or we will have to voluntarily comply

with immediate disciplinary proceedings under whatever protection
or privilege can be secured through legislation to prevent

unfair influence on pending litigation.

This issue is currently under study by the Public Oversight
Board.

A comprehensive study of all the legal questions and

implications has been completed which essentially concludes

that there are no existing legal barriers to immediate disciplinary

proceedings where litigation is involved.

I cannot predict what

conclusion will be reached by the Public Oversight Board, but
it may well conclude that our present policy is not warranted
and should be changed.

If so, it would substantially complicate

the process of handling technical standards cases.

We ought to

be considering how to deal with this problem in the event it

should materialize.
Another unrelated suggestion which I would like to make
pertains to the recent trends which have surfaced in our ethical

rulings and interpretations.

It seems to me that we have fallen

victim to attempting to replace judgment with a mass of detailed
guides that attempt to cover every conceivable circumstance

however inconsequential or infrequently encountered.

I believe

this tends to be counter-productive in that the objective gets
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lost in the detail and our members become confused by the
growing body of dos and donts.

I urge that we reexamine our

approach and place more emphasis on stating the broad objectives
without attempting to be quite so definitive.
One final matter that I would like to touch on is the
matter of scope of services.

As you know,

the question of

proscribing certain types of consulting services is currently
under study by the Public Oversight Board.

While its conclusions

will not necessarily apply to all our members, it will be
difficult to restrict them only to SEC Section members,

particularly if they are based on concerns about the effects
on audit independence.

Fortunately, I believe that the POB is not inclined to
find that proscriptions of MAS are necessary.

If this proves

to be the case, it may pose problems in our relations with
the SEC but it will at least avoid what will otherwise be a
difficult question for the professional ethics division to

resolve.

Even so, we should be prepared to take prompt and

appropriate action with respect to our independence rules as

soon as a decision on the scope of services question is resolved.
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CONCLUSION

We are obviously operating in times of rapidly changing
expectations and needs.

The decision as to whether the profes

sion will be allowed to remain self-regulated hinges to a

considerable degree on how well we police the quality of
work being performed by the profession.

It is imperative,

therefore, that we concentrate our future efforts on disciplining
our members for substandard work and to do this far more

effectively than we have in the past.

This will be extremely difficult to do but we must find

a way.

We must rethink our traditional approaches and devise

new solutions.

It is urgent that we do this.

By working together, the state societies, the AICPA, and

NASBA can do what is right

for the public and the profession,

which is not necessarily inconsistent.

Your task is a vital

part of the profession's program to regain a high level of
credibility and you are to be commended for devoting your time
and effort to this very important mission.

to do so.

I urge you to continue

